US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01477.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 35KB | 703 lines

$Unique_ID{USH01477}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 21C  The Assault}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{saipan
japanese
admiral
troops
june
guam
landing
assault
ships
attack}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 21C  The Assault

     Not all the observers or participants saw the initial assault landings in
the same way.  In the eyes of the big boss, Vice Admiral Turner, everything
was pretty much "on the button":

Initial landings were made successfully on schedule in the face of severe
machine gun and mortar fire.  This type of opposition proved to be a most
critical feature of the day's operation as a deterrent element.  Dive bombing
by planes and close interdictive fire by supporting ships proved to be
effective counter measures . . . .

By 1800, Line 01 [first day's objective] reached.  20,000 troops had been
landed.

     Rear Admiral Hill, the boss at the next echelon down, detailed the
assault landings in these words:

The landing was made with precision and with only a slight difference in time
of landing of first waves on all beaches.  Casualties in troops and vehicles
en route to the beach were extremely light, but shortly after landing the
beach area was brought under fire by mortars and light artillery defiladed on
the high ground in rear of the beaches.  These guns were well camouflaged and
difficult to locate and during the first three days continued to inflict
serious casualties upon our troops and beach parties.

By evening a narrow beachhead had been won, with a gap between Second and
Fourth MARDIVS in Charan Kanoa Town.  Heavy swells had built up on the reef.
Two [actually eight] loaded LVT's were overturned and several men drowned.  It
was necessary to suspend unloading by LVT across the reef Dog night.

     Way, way down the command chain, some of the operational problems loomed
larger in the Dog Day reports.

     The Commander of the LCI gunboats logged the reasons for not providing
all the planned close gunfire support of the initial assault waves as follows:

The LCI(G)'s were stationed at the line of departure by 0750 and . . . .
preceded the first assault waves into the beaches by 200 yards.

. . . Due to the protruding reef, the LCI(G)'s did not open fire with their
20mm guns or fire their rockets [on Red and Green beaches] as the range was
too great for effective fire . . . .  LCI(G)'s firing on Blue and Yellow
beaches were able to get close enough to the beaches to effectively fire their
20mm guns and rockets.

While leading the first waves into the beach numerous mortar bursts landed in
the water very close to the line of advancing LCI(G)'s.  LCI(G) 726 suffered a
direct mortar hit, killing 2 enlisted men and wounding the Commanding Officer,
one other officer and two (2) enlisted men . . . .  Other LCI(G)'s had a great
many pieces of shrapnel from mortar shells . . . .  LCI(G)-451, firing on Red
Beach suffered one direct hit from a salvo of enemy shells of 3" to 5"
diameter.  The shell hit the starboard life raft, took off part of the ladder
from the maindeck aft to the top of the deck house, went thru the main deck
and out the side of the ship in number 4 troop compartment, just forward of
the magazines.  It severed the entire main electric trunk line . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

About 2500 yards from the beach we started to fire.  We continued to fire
until the boats reached the reefs.  It seemed that our shots were falling
short of the beach.

                  *         *         *         *         *

Fired ranging shots of rockets, but they did not reach the beach.  Fired, in
all, four rounds of ranging shots but as they did not reach the beach, did not
fire any more rockets.

     The LST's had their problems also.

0637 bow doors opened.  0703 ramp completely lowered.  Port ramp chain broken.
0704 1st LVT off.  0711 17th LVT off.  Both ramp chains broken.

                  *         *         *         *         *

2140, severely damaged our ramp while recovering disabled LVT's.  The hinge
which controls the ramp parted, with the exception of one small piece . . . .
Due to this ramp condition it was impossible to launch the three LVT's on
board after completion of repairs.

                  *         *         *         *         *

This ship launched 17 tanks in seven minutes and thirty seconds.

     Despite the swell described officially as "mild" at 0700 on 15 June, not
all landing craft commanders agreed.  For example:

This vessel first to complete disembarking all vehicles.  Both ramp chains
parted due to heavy swell, ramp emergency raising gear carried away - rigged
jury rig immediately.

                  *         *         *         *         *

Vessels this Task Unit arrived at line of departure and began launching LVT's
and DUKWs in accordance with schedule.  Surf conditions unfavorable, making
launching difficult.  Several vehicles suffered damage and the ramps and ramp
hoisting gear of several LST's were damaged.  Launching was accomplished,
however, without delay.

     The Japanese coast defense guns and artillery worried the landing craft
late on Dog Day and the conscience of at least one of the skippers who
retreated from them.  Representative LST reports follow.

D-Day night about 1915 LST-224 was fired upon from Saipan.  Four shells hit
ahead of the starboard bow approximately 100 yards.  The enemy apparently
sought and obtained our range with what appeared to be 5" shells.  Their
deflection was off about 100 yards which provided time to get underway and
back down away from the shelling . . . .  Having orders not to fire on the
Island, and our heaviest gun being 3" 50 cal., the only alternative was to
withdraw out of range to protect the ship's personnel and cargo, as did other
landing craft in the area.

                  *         *         *         *         *

Constant reports from the beach described very rough fighting, particularly
during the night, which kept our forces from maintaining orderly dumps.

                  *         *         *         *         *

All seriously wounded men were sent to other ships which had doctors, this
being sometimes hard to do because hospital ships were not always in sight and
it was like sending the coxswains on a wild goose chase.  However, it would
have been folly to try to care for apparently dying men on a ship without
skilled doctors.

The Weather Deteriorates

     Rear Admiral Hill had this to say about the weather:

A heavy swell, which existed from the night of Dog Day until Dog plus One
morning, prevented delivery of supplies across the barrier reef facing Red,
Green, and Yellow beaches and forced all supplies for both divisions to be
handled across Blue Beaches.

     While this was a temporary problem, the longer range problem was:

Unloading of boats on the Red beaches was possible only from two hours before
until two hours after high tide.

     As Commander Transport Division Twenty reported in regard to Dog Day plus
one:

The congestion of boats at the reef continued because of the limited beach
usable at high tide and the fact that boats could not reach the beach at low
tide.

     Early construction of a causeway pier at Beach Blue One facilitated
logistic support, and LST's were beached successfully on the reef opposite
Yellow One on 17 June.  The 27th Division troops were put ashore on the 16th,
17th, and 19th, the last Regimental Combat Team wading ashore from LST's
beached on the reef opposite Yellow Three.

By Dog plus Three there were nearly 50,000 troops ashore and a large amount of
artillery.

     There were problems other than the heavy surf which held up logistic
support from time to time during the first few days.  These were the Japanese
aircraft flown down from Iwo Jima and the Empire.

The Japanese Gadflies

     The amphibians had gotten through the Kwajalein and Eniwetok assaults
without a single Japanese airplane to worry them.  This was not the case in
the Marianas.

     Task Force 51 was sighted by a Japanese plane the morning of 13 June and
was under minor air attack three times on 15 June by one to five Japanese
planes.  No air attacks on Task Force 51 occurred on 16 June.  There were five
attacks by formations of three to forty Japanese planes commencing late in the
day of 17 June 1944.  From that date until 7 July the amphibians ate smoke a
fair share of each night.  There were 70 designated Japanese air raids noted
during these twenty days, but the largest number of planes in a single attack
was 12, and a good share of the Japanese planes were shot down by the combat
air patrol before getting in close to the amphibians.  By and large, the
Japanese planes came down the Marianas Chain to the battle area and were
reserviced at Guam and Rota.  During the days of the Battle of the Philippine
Sea a number of planes were flown into Guam from the Japanese carriers and
enroute they harassed the amphibians.

     All the amphibious craft contributed their might to the defense of the
Transport Area, as the following LST reports will indicate:

At 1915 a single engine Jap bomber dove at us from starboard to port at a
distance of about 50 yards off the water, dropping a small bomb which missed.
All the ships in the area opened fire but none seen to hit the plane which was
very fast and visible at most for only a second or two, as the time of night
and overcast sky made visibility very poor.

     Another witness pictured this incident as follows:

On the evening of 17 June, the retiring LST's were attacked by one VAL.  Fire
was not opened until the plane was in the dive.  It was ineffective.  For the
majority of the LST's, this was the first Jap plane they had ever seen.  It is
certain that buck fever had many of the gunners.  The one bomb released was a
near miss off the bow of LST-42.  Strafing, or gunfire from other LST's
started a fire forward on LST-84 . . . .  LST-23 and LST-128 also had
casualties resulting from shrapnel.

     And the final report of this brief incident:

The Japanese bomber was about as accurate as our gunfire.  With upward of 30
ships to hit, he scored a good clean miss.

     Rear Admiral Conolly had talked to everyone who would listen about the
great value of smoke during air attacks and while a "Smoke Plan" had existed
throughout the Central Pacific campaign, Saipan marked its first extensive
use.  By the time Saipan had been secured, the amphibians had absorbed many
Japanese air raids and only the jeep carrier Fanshaw Bay and the battleship
Maryland absorbed hits from them.  The plane that torpedoed the Maryland while
she was anchored sneaked in without being detected by radar.  Rear Admiral
Hill noted:

Despite this large number of air attacks, only minor damage was suffered.
This fact is attributed in part to the excellence of land based anti-aircraft
batteries and night fighters, but at least equal credit should be given to the
protection provided the ships by heavy smoke cover.

     The cargo ship Mercury (AK-42) was the first amphibious ship to gain a
sure kill of a Japanese plane since the George F. Elliott absorbed one at
Guadalcanal nearly two years before.  Vice Admiral Turner's War Diary stated:

The Mercury was credited with a kill when a Jap plane was destroyed by
crashing into one of her booms.  The pilot was killed.

                  *         *         *         *         *

Enemy tactics in the air have persistently been to fly low to avoid radar
detection.  Steps have been taken to rearrange our radar pickets so as to
improve our technique in picking up these planes.

The Japanese First Mobile Fleet Moves Up

     Long before the battle on Saipan had been won, the Japanese First Mobile
Fleet, under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, took a fling at our amphibious
forces, but found that Admiral Spruance and a reenforced Task Force 58 stood
in the way.

     Separately, the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 comprised seven carriers and
eight cruiser-hulled carriers, guarded by seven fast battleships, three heavy
cruisers, ten light cruisers and 52 destroyers.  Ships pulled out from the
Joint Expeditionary Force and added to TF 58 included four heavy cruisers,
three light anti-aircraft cruisers and 18 destroyers.  Additionally, the Fleet
Flagship Indianapolis with its two protecting destroyers moved from TF 51 to
TF 58.

     Also, the eight older battleships, the three remaining cruisers and a
good share of the remaining destroyers of the Joint Expeditionary Force were
told off to cover the Transport Area during darkness from a position about 25
miles to its westward, especially to guard against the possibility that a fast
detachment of the Japanese First Mobile Fleet might do an end run around TF 58
and seek to attack the cargo ships and disrupt the logistic support of the
troops on Saipan.

Days of Change

     The 16th and 17th of June 1944, were days when the plans of the Joint
Expeditionary Force were subject to many changes, as the Japanese First Mobile
Fleet charged into the Philippine Sea from Tawi Tawi.

     Kelly Turner's War Diary had these entries:

TG 52.10, Bombardment Group Two and the Hopkins, Perry, Long and Hamilton had
been directed to proceed to Guam to initiate scheduled attack [on June 18th].
However, due to imminence of a major engagement west of Saipan, Com 5th Fleet
cancelled the tentative date of attack on Guam and directed CTF 51 to make
preparations to reinforce carrier forces of TF 58.

     The Battle of the Philippine Sea has been well and brilliantly told by a
number of authors.  There has been strong support from the Marines, from those
who were in the amphibious forces, and from Fleet Admiral King in regard to
the manner in which the battle was fought by Admiral Spruance.

     Admiral Turner wrote in his speech "Major Aspects of the Marianas
Campaign":

Before leaving Pearl Harbor, lengthy discussions were held concerning the
prospect of Fleet action.  Tentative decisions were made as to what action we
should take if Fleet action should eventuate.  The ideas of major commands
were in complete accord that whatever happened, Task Force 58 would adequately
cover the Expeditionary Force during its landing of troops.

On June 16th, it became certain that the Japanese Fleet would attack.  We
believed then, and know now, that Admiral Toyoda's objective was air attack on
the transports, using the airfields on Guam and Tinian for refueling and
rearming.

So on June 16th, after further conferences, Admiral Spruance made these
decisions:

a.  Reenforce TF 58 with 7 cruisers and 18 destroyers from the Expeditionary
Force, and concentrated at noon June 18th, 350 miles to west to (1) cover the
Saipan landings and (2) attack the Japanese Fleet.

b.  Continue transport unloading until dark June 17th, [then] leave behind the
transports and LST's needed immediately, plus screen and small craft, and
secretly move the bulk of transports and LST's out of sight to the eastward of
Saipan.  From there, transports and LST's would be returned for unloading as
called for.

c.  Continue full gunfire support of troops, but during darkness form up
remaining battleships, cruisers and DDs 25 miles to the west in covering
position.

d.  With three CVE divisions, provide [combat air patrol] CAP for ships near
Saipan, and provide air for troops support as available.

What happened?

By dark June 18th, the enemy Fleet was thought to be still well to the
westward.  Admiral Spruance was strongly urged by some officers to make a fast
run west and surprise the enemy at dawn.  Instead he retired, as previously
planned, toward Guam.

In fact, the end run had already been made [by the Japanese].  At 0720 next
morning CAP planes of the nearby Task Force 58 caught Japanese planes taking
off from the Guam airfield after re-fueling.  Then the Turkey Shoot began.  By
nightfall, Admiral Toyoda had had enough and started home.  For a few days,
our forces at Saipan had some minor air attacks by planes from Guam that had
remained hidden, but damage was slight and there was not much interference
with our landing operations.

The point is mentioned to emphasize the importance of sticking to the
objective.  The Fifth Fleet objective then was the capture of Saipan, and only
secondarily the defeat of the Japanese Fleet.  To capture Saipan, we needed
the transports afloat and not sunk.  Suppose at 0800 on June 19th, Admiral
Mitscher had been 600 miles away with all his planes in the air!

Admiral Spruance's decision to adhere strictly to a course of action that
would ensure the accomplishment of the major objective of that great military
adventure was sound and wise.

     Long before World War II ended, Fleet Admiral King had expressed his
strong approval of the manner in which the Battle of the Philippine Sea was
fought.  In his Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy, issued 27 March
1945, and covering combat operations from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945, Fleet
Admiral King wrote:

As the primary mission of the American Forces in the area was to capture the
Marianas, the Saipan amphibious operations had to be protected from enemy
interference at all costs.  In his plans for what developed into the Battle of
the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance was rightly guided by this basic mission.
He therefore operated aggressively to the westward of the Marianas, but did
not draw his carriers and battleships so far away that they could not protect
the amphibious units.

In 1952, this still remained his view.

     While Admiral Spruance was beating off the onrush of the Japanese Fleet,
the situation ashore had continued to improve, and on 20 June, Lieutenant
General H. M. Smith, Commander Northern Troops And Landing Force (CTG 56.1),
assumed command ashore at about 1000.

     After the threat of the Japanese Fleet had been met and successfully
dissipated by the Fifth Fleet under Admiral Spruance, the Commander Joint
Expeditionary Force turned his thoughts again to the necessity of conserving
the troops previously allotted for the Guam assault for that purpose.  The
Commander Joint Expeditionary Troops, being faced with a rugged and skillful
defense by larger than anticipated Japanese forces on Saipan, and an
extinction chore that was going slowly, cast envious eyes on the troops
allocated for the Guam assault.

     In a despatch designed to restate the necessity of retaining the troops
still afloat and regaining control of those (the 106th Regimental Combat Team)
already ashore on Saipan, Vice Admiral Turner informed CTF 56 that:

While recognizing the decisive character of the operations for the capture of
Saipan, the great importance of the early capture of Guam in this campaign is
also realized.  Unless further shore operations become unfavorable, CTF 51 is
not willing to accept the decision to postpone the Guam attack until the
Army's 77th Division arrives.

     Despite this unwillingness of CTF 51, the Guam attack was postponed until
after the 77th Division arrived there.  In fact, the date for launching the
Guam assault was set exactly by the "when" the 77th would be available at
Guam.

The Delayed Time Table

     The Japanese defense at Saipan was stronger and more successful than had
been anticipated.  By 21 June, the whole of the Expeditionary Force Reserve
had been landed, bringing to three full divisions plus Fifth Corps troops
fighting on Saipan.  The very bitter defense encountered thereafter eventually
led to the unwelcome but quite sound decision not to go ahead with a landing
on Guam until Saipan was in hand.  That is, it was better to ensure the
complete control of Saipan rather than to have a foothold on both Saipan and
Guam without complete control of either one.  The troops of the Southern
Attack Force were looked upon as a possible further reserve to bolster the
hard fighting troops on Saipan.  So the Southern Attack Force cruised around
and around to the eastward of Saipan, waiting for favorable developments,
before undertaking its assault on Guam.

     On 17 June it was decided by CINCPOA to prepare one Regimental Combat
Team in Hawaii for possible early employment in the Marianas by immediate
movement to Saipan.

     On the 21st, the decision was taken to bring all the 77th Infantry
Division forward from the Hawaiian Islands as soon as practicable.  By dark 22
June, the last of enough transports to lift two Regimental Combat Teams of the
77th Infantry Division were unloaded at Saipan and hurried back to Pearl.
Lift for the initial RCT of the 77th was already gathering at Pearl Harbor.

     As Vice Admiral Turner wrote to his old subordinate, Wilkinson:

It was evident that we needed that division for Guam and, in fact, used it
beginning the second day of the Guam landing.

     On 24 June, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade was designated the
Floating Reserve for the Saipan operation and the rest of the Southern Landing
Force was ordered to return to Eniwetok to await the decision as to when it
would assault Guam.

     On 5 July 1944, Vice Admiral Turner wrote a letter to Admiral Nimitz
which among other things said:

Of course, we all feel disappointed over the fact that the Marianas Campaign
is not going as rapidly as had been hoped for, particularly because of the ill
effect on Stalemate [Palau Island-Assault].

                  *         *         *         *         *

There will be a let-down at the end of the Saipan capture, as the troops are
only human, and it would be desirable to have some fresh troops for Tinian,
though that is now impossible.  We will get ready for that operation as soon
as possible, but can't predict the date.  It would be better, for some
reasons, to hold off until the attack on Guam is well started, but we will not
do so if we can get the troops rehabilitated in time.

     And when it got down to hard actualities, Vice Admiral Turner did hold
off on Tinian until the attack on Guam was well started.  The latter started
on 21 July and the Tinian assault three days later.

     In the letter of 30 July 1944, to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, in discussing
the delay in capturing Saipan, Vice Admiral Turner wrote:

We simply didn't have enough troops here, and the reason we didn't have enough
troops was that we didn't have enough ships to bring them in.

     The number of ships available in the Pacific for Forager was strongly
influenced by the fact that the gargantuan amphibious landing in Normandy,
France, occurred earlier in the same month as Saipan and had an overriding
call on worldwide transport and cargo ship resources.

At Long Last

     Slow, but steady progress was made in capturing Saipan.

     The Fourth of July was celebrated by taking the towns of Garapan and
Tanapag.  Five days later:

The Marines raised the American Flag over the airstrip at the northern part of
Saipan.  By 1625, the entire island was secured and organized resistance
ceased.

     Vice Admiral Turner sent the following despatch:

To our brave troops who have captured Saipan, the naval forces who have
striven to assist them, I make a bow of respect.

The Cost

     On 10 July, the day after Saipan was declared "secure," Vice Admiral
Turner logged:

The following is the estimate of casualties to our forces as of 1800 today.
Total casualties 15,053.  Of this number 2,359 were killed, 11,481 wounded and
1,213 are missing.  Enemy dead buried by our troops number 11,948.  There are
9,006 civilians interned and 736 prisoners of war.

     Many of our missing turned out to be dead.  The total of Japanese buried
went up rapidly in the days ahead until it reached 25,144 on 15 August 1944.

Naval Gunfire Support

     The Naval Gunfire Support prior to the assault landings an Saipan was
divided into three phases:

Phase One - Dog Day Minus Two (13 June 1944)

     This phase was conducted from 1040 to 1725 by seven new fast battleships
temporarily detached from Task Force 58, and their anti-submarine screen of
eleven destroyers.  The bombardment was fired using plane spot and from ranges
in excess of 10,000 yards.  This latter precaution was necessary to keep the
ships outside of mineable waters until these waters were swept.

     Since the Japanese on Saipan had British Whitworth Armstrong 6-inch coast
defense guns, as well as their own 140-millimeter coast defense guns, the
statement that the big battleships at 10,000 to 16,000 yards remained out of
range of the enemy shore batteries, is incorrect.

     The results of the gun bombardment by the fast battleships during Phase
were incommensurate with the weight of metal dropped on Saipan during this
bombardment.  This was due primarily to inexperience of both the aircraft
observers in locating Japanese camouflaged guns and of the gunnery personnel
in conducting slow deliberate shore bombardment.

     But as the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops reported:

Heavy gun installations, power plans, barracks, the buildings of the town and
installations at or near the airfield received a particularly heavy shelling.

Phase Two - Dog Day Minus One (14 June 1944)

     A succinct summary by the Marines of this phase indicated:

This bombardment was executed by ships of Task Group 52.17, nearly all of
which had had considerable [gunfire support] experience . . . .  Their fire
delivered with both air and ship spot, was very effective, including direct
hits on many important installations.

Phase Three - Dog Day (15 June 1944)

     As for the last phase:

This firing was executed by ships of Task Group 52.17.  It destroyed or
neutralized a great many important targets and neutralized the beaches
sufficiently that the assault troops were able to effect a landing.

                  *         *         *         *         *

As a result of Naval gunfire and air bombardment, many coast defense guns were
destroyed and the enemy was, according to Prisoner of War statements, forced
to evacuate his prepared beach defenses except for a small delaying forces.
Forward slopes facing seaward were rendered only temporarily tenable to the
enemy, and his supply, transport, and communication facilities and
organizations were reduced to a state of chaos.

     Due to the excellence of the Japanese camouflage, the very large number
of targets, and the fact that neither photography nor visual observation had
located many targets on the reverse slopes of the hills eastward of the
landing beaches, numerous Japanese mortars and artillery guns were not fired
upon prior to the actual Saipan landing.

     As late as three months after Saipan had been captured, Lieutenant
General Smith, it seems, thought the naval gunfire support in the Marianas was
reasonably satisfactory for he wrote in his final report on Forager:

Naval gunfire support was a decisive factor in the conduct of operations, and
it is recommended:

1.  That whenever possible, similar extended, deliberate, observed fires be
delivered against landing beaches and enemy positions prior to the landing.

     Some five years later, however, the worm had turned and the bombardment
of Saipan was labeled by General Smith, "The partially ineffective Saipan
bombardment."  He also stated:

Three and a half days of surface and air bombardment were not enough to
neutralize an enemy of the strength we found on Saipan.

Skill and Hazard

     The pinpointed naval gunfire bombardment essential to accomplish the
results desired by the assault troops is a difficult chore, and involves
manifold hazards and calls for first-rate skills.  These aspects were touched
upon several times in the reports on the Saipan operation.

     The fire control ships were directed to lie to in order to ensure that
they would not interfere with the movement of the assault waves to the beach.
Throughout the critical assault landing phase, while in this minimum defensive
position, they unhappily were in triple jeopardy from coast defense guns,
submarines, and air attack.  As Rear Admiral Hill noted:

Close fire support ships were required to remain dead in the water in accurate
positions prescribed, from How minus Thirty until the passage of the last
assault boat wave.  The final support positions were established to place
heavy ships at the stipulated minimum distance of 2000 yards from the nearest
shoal or reef, and destroyers 1500 yards.

Ammunition replacement was another constant worry.  At the end of Dog plus
two:

With no immediate replacement of ammunition available, it became necessary to
restrict the rate of starshell expenditure to 6 per hour per ship except for
emergencies, and to limit the amount of AA common available for support of
troops to all in excess of 60 rounds per gun, per ship, which was to be held
in reserve for surface and air action.

     Rear Admiral Hill, a long time naval gunnery expert, finished up the
Saipan operation with a very warm feeling for the naval gunfire support
provided.  He wrote:

There can remain little doubt that naval gunfire is the most feared and most
effective of all weapons which the Japanese are confronted in resisting a
landing and assault.  Without exception, prisoners of war have stated that
naval gunfire prevented their movement by day or night and was the most
deciding factor in accomplishing their defeat.

     This opinion was supported by the Chief of Staff of the Japanese high
command on Saipan who in reporting to Army Headquarters in Tokyo, radioed:

The call fire on land is extremely quick and exact and until night attack
units are some tens of meters from the enemy, they continue to receive naval
gunfire.

                  *         *         *         *         *

If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that we could
fight it out with the enemy in decisive battle.

     The most vocal supporters of naval gunfire effectiveness were the
Japanese prisoners and diarists.  Among their many plugs for the Navy gun, the
following are selected:

[POW]  The greatest single factor in the American success [was] naval
gunfire -

[Diarist]  Practically all our anti-aircraft guns and machine gun positions
were destroyed by bombing and shelling on the 13th, 14th and 15th . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

[Diarist]  I have at last come to the place where I will die.  I am pleased to
think that I will die calmly in true samurai style.  Naval gun fire supported
this attack which was too terrible for words.  [Diary 13 June, Day of
Bombardment by fast battleships].

     As previously noted, there were some balancing U.S. opinions to come to
light a bit later.

     Since the length of the shore gun bombardment is always brought into
question in connection with an assault landing, it is worth stating that long
continued shore gun bombardment by heavy ships always draws enemy submarines
to the area like bees to a honey comb.  It was true at Guadalcanal, in the
Gilberts, and in the Marshalls.  So there was and is a naval reluctance to
stay still in one spot in an area or even to stay around in an area too long
and invite submarine attack.  This is despite the real advantages to the
assaulting troops of a long continued gun bombardment.

     A study of Japanese naval records by the Far East Command in the early
1950's indicated that the Japanese lost fourteen submarines in the Marianas
area during June and July 1944.  These were RO-36, 42, 44, 48, 111, 114, 117,
the I-5, 10, 26, 54, 55, 184, 185.  It was a minor miracle, despite our very
excellent anti-submarine defense, that the ships of Task Force 51 and of Task
Force 58 remained for long weeks in the vicinity of the Marianas without
sustaining losses from these Japanese submarines.

The Hard Won Victory

     While the skill of our commanders was great and the valor of our troops
unending, the battle was made longer by the low ratio of assaulting troops to
enemy defenders.  It would be unperceptive not to say also that a basic
ingredient in the long and bloody struggle for Saipan was the confidence of
the Japanese Commander and his troops in their ability to defeat an amphibious
assault.

     And a quixotic ingredient in the cause of the Japanese eventual defeat is
drawn from the following record:

A POW taken late in the preceding period near Matansa, states that he is a
chief Petty Officer.  Was Chief Yeoman to Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander
Central Pacific Area, with Headquarters at Garapan, Saipan.  POW states that
Vice Admiral Nagumo and Rear Admiral Yano committed suicide 1030 7 July at the
temporary headquarters located inland from Matansa.  POW witnessed the
suicides . . . .  POW, acting in his capacity of Chief Yeoman wrote the order
issued by Vice Admiral Nagumo for the counter attack against our forces on the
morning of 7 July.  The same order commanded all civilian and military
personnel remaining on the north end of Saipan to commit suicide on 7 July
. . . .

Saipan Land Marks

     As one of the most experienced amphibians, Commodore H. B. Knowles, wrote
at the end of the war in regard to amphibious techniques:

The Saipan Landing Plan is a landmark in Pacific amphibious history, for it
incorporates what became the technique for all later amphibious landings in
the Central Pacific and the major assaults in the Philippines.  Described in
this plan for the first time are the duties and organization of a control and
beachmaster set up to handle a landing of multiple troop divisions; an
expanded communication net work to cover this more complex structure; a system
for the transfer of assault troops to LST's in the final staging area and the
despatch of LVT's at the Line of Departure with troops already embarked; the
use of rocket and mortar ships in direct support of the assault waves; and the
addition of hospital LST's close in shore to speed casualty handling.